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Power distribution in ambiguous times:
The effects of the financial crisis on executive
decision-making in Germany and Spain1
Zusammenfassung
Machtarithmetik in unsicheren Zeiten. Die Auswir-
kungen der Finanzkrise auf exekutive Entscheidungs-
prozesse in Deutschland und Spanien
Der Beitrag analysiert Dynamiken exekutiver Ent-
scheidungsprozesse während der globalen Finanz- und
Wirtschaftskrise in der deutschen und spanischen Re-
gierungsorganisation in 2008 und 2009. Dem power-
distributional Ansatz folgend wird argumentiert, dass
Merkmale des institutionellen Kontextes die Institutio-
nalisierung der exekutiven Entscheidungsfindung
während der Krise beeinflussen. In diesem Artikel
werden insbesondere die Effekte der konstitutionellen
Entscheidungsprinzipien im Kabinett sowie der Bezie-
hungen zwischen Exekutive und Legislative auf exe-
kutive Entscheidungsprozesse untersucht. Die verglei-
chende Analyse zeigt, dass in beiden Ländern die exe-
kutive Entscheidungsfindung zentralisiert wurde,
wenngleich in der deutschen Exekutive weniger inten-
siv als in der spanischen Regierungsorganisation. Die-
se Unterschiede lassen sich durch die institutionellen
Rahmenbedingungen beider Länder erklären, die die
Autorität der deutschen Bundeskanzlerin beschränken
und die Dominanz des spanischen Premierministers
(PM) fördern. Darüber hinaus beschränken die Be-
ziehungen zwischen Exekutive und Legislative in
Deutschland eine starke Zentralisierung exekutiver
Entscheidungsprozesse, auch da parteipolitische Ak-
teure an Entscheidungskompromissen in der Ministe-
rialverwaltung teilhaben, während diese Beziehungen
in Spanien eine Zentralisierung der Entscheidungsfin-
dung eröffnen, unterstützt durch außerordentliche
Rechtsverfahren, die während der Krise angewendet
werden und parlamentarische sowie parteipolitische
Auseinandersetzungen einschränken.
 Schlagworte: Koordination, Ministerialverwaltung,
Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise, Neo-Institutionalis-
mus, Politikberatung
Abstract
This article examines the dynamics of executive de-
cision-making in Germany and Spain during the
global financial and economic crisis between 2008
and 2009. It applies the power-distributional ap-
proach and argues that distinct features of the insti-
tutional context affect the institutionalisation of de-
cision-making arrangements during crises. In par-
ticular, it examines how the principles structuring
cabinet and the nexus between the executive and the
legislative influence the change or inertia of ar-
rangements for executive decision-making. The
comparative analysis reveals that both countries ex-
perienced a centralisation of executive decision-
making, albeit less in Germany than in Spain. These
differences are caused by the institutional setting of
both countries constraining the Chancellor’s author-
ity in Germany and permitting the dominance of the
Spanish Prime Minister (PM) in cabinet. Further-
more, the relationships between the executive and
the legislative obstruct a strong centralisation of ex-
ecutive decision-making in Germany, also because
party-political actors are aligned to compromises in
the executive, and facilitate a centralisation of ex-
ecutive decision-making in Spain, supported by ex-
traordinary law-making procedures which have been
applied in order to circumvent parliamentary and
thus party-political debates.
Key words: Coordination, Ministerial bureaucracy,
Economic and financial crisis, New institutionalism,
Policy advice
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1. Introduction
Crises are perceived as distinct events of widely recognised concern which require imme-
diate action, but are also characterised by high uncertainty about these solutions (see Boin
et al. 2005, 2005; ’t Hart et al. 2010). Many authors argue that during such events gov-
ernment decision-making becomes centralised, although depending on the distinct per-
ception of time pressure, the level of decision-making, and the structures and procedures
for crisis management (’t Hart et al. 1993). In addition, these scholars emphasise the rele-
vance of ‘shared power settings’ between actors coping with the crisis (Boin/’t Hart
2003: 547). In contrast, this article aims to explain how pre-existing institutional struc-
tures of central government organisations affect the power distribution among executive
actors in responding to crises and analyses these patterns of governmental decision-
making during the global financial and economic crisis. It focuses particularly on internal
dynamics within central government organisations and thus excludes multi-level dynam-
ics across countries that may unfold e.g. at the EU or G20 level.
To analyse the relevance of pre-existing institutional underpinnings of executive de-
cision-making during the financial and economic crisis, this article compares two rather
similar Western European countries, Spain and Germany. On the one hand, both coun-
tries are parliamentary systems with the characteristic ‘fusion’ (King 1976) between the
legislative and the executive. On the other hand, the cabinet in both countries is struc-
tured by rather similar constitutional principles, comprising the principles of leadership
by the head of government, by departmental ministers, and by collective cabinet (Art. 65
GG; articles 98.2, 99, 100, 101 and 108 of the Spanish Constitution; Bar 2004: 76). In
contrast, the evolution and effects of the global financial and economic crisis on both
countries required different governmental responses. Initially, Spain had nearly none sub-
primes and due to its tight banking regulation a rather healthy banking sector, whereas
German banks had heavily invested in sub-primes, resulting in several bail-outs. As a
consequence, the German government was comparatively stronger forced to formulate
measures for stabilising the financial sector whereas the Spanish government could rely
upon existing regulation in order to cope with the financial crisis. However, Spain experi-
enced already rather early severe effects on the national economy, also because of devel-
opments on its housing market, whereas Germany faced an economic downturn rather
late. Accordingly, both countries applied rather similar instruments, most notably eco-
nomic stimulus packages, but the Spanish government adopted these measures earlier
than the German government. In sum, the two governments under scrutiny adopted dif-
ferent measures to cope with the financial and economic crisis. The literature on decision-
making during crises suggests that the formulation of these different policy responses is
dominated by a stronger centre of government, this article aims to analyse whether and
how such a centralisation of decision-making unfolds and argues that pre-existing institu-
tional features affect this power distribution among executive actors.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: The next section illustrates the
theoretical argument and formulates the claims for empirical analysis. The third section
presents the two case studies on central government decision-making during the financial
and economic crisis in Spain and Germany. Finally, the article draws empirical conclu-
sions on the institutionalisation of arrangements for executive decision-making during the
economic and financial crisis and their duration in the future.
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2. Theoretical framework: The institutionalisation of executive
decision-making
The change and inertia of institutional arrangements have been examined by different
new institutionalist approaches trying to ascertain whether institutionalisation processes
follow a logic of consequentiality or appropriateness (Hall/Taylor 1996). This article ar-
gues that decision-making mechanisms within the executive can be understood as institu-
tional arrangements that are created, maintained, or changed in processes of institutionali-
sation. Following the recent debate in new institutionalist theory which emphasises the
recursive nature of such institutionalisation processes unfolding between institutions and
organisational actors (Meyer/Rowan 1977; DiMaggio/Powell 1983, 1988, 1991; Meyer/
Scott 1983; Powell 1991; Scott 2008), this article applies the so-called ‘power-distributional
approach’ and focuses on mechanisms of institutionalisation (Thelen 2003: 221; Streeck/
Thelen 2005). Here, institutions are defined as formal and informal arrangements that are
repetitive in time and have an impact on power relations among individual and organisa-
tional actors. The power-distributional approach to institutionalisation argues that if such
institutions are affected by actors, their basic properties ‘must be defined in ways that
provide some dynamic element that permits such change’ (Mahoney/Thelen 2010: 10; see
also Orren/Skowroneck 1994). Accordingly, this approach understands institutions as
‘distributional instruments laden with power implications’ (Mahoney/Thelen 2010: 10)
and focuses on the gradual institutionalisation of such arrangements, which may eventu-
ally transform the institutional status quo (Thelen 2009: 476). It addresses particularly in-
stitutions already in place such as political and political-economic institutions (Maho-
ney/Thelen 2010: 10). It argues that the institutional context imposes distinct conse-
quences on actors in institutionalisation processes who ‘cultivate change from within the
context of existing opportunities and constraints’ and act ‘around elements they cannot
change while attempting to harness and utilize others in novel ways’ (Streeck/Thelen
2005b: 19; Thelen 2009: 488-9). During crises, such institutionalisation processes may
result either in the preservation of pre-existing arrangements or the emergence of new
ones – eventually affecting the power relations between executive actors. Put differently,
this article assumes that crises as extraordinary events motivate actors to become engage
in the institutionalisation of arrangements for executive decision-making, but these dy-
namics are constrained by the institutional context. This theoretical argument departs
from the basic tenets sustained in Thelen (2003) and others by focusing on the power dis-
tributional effect through institutionalisation processes by which institutions become re-
petitive either through maintenance or slow gradual changes.
The article focuses on two particular institutional features which are assumed to af-
fect both political and administrative actors within executives (Goetz 2003: 61-2). On the
one hand, it examines the explanatory relevance of principles structuring cabinet deci-
sion-making that prescribe the concentration or dispersion of authority in cabinet and in-
clude formal rules, e.g. veto rights of individual cabinet ministers, as well as informal
rules that emerge over time, such as not to interfere in cabinet colleagues’ proposals as
long as they do not affect own responsibilities (Mayntz 1980: 156). During crises, it is
very likely that cabinets with centripetal decision-making and dominated by a single actor
increase the centralisation of executive decision-making, thus strengthening already
‘tried-and-tested’ centralised decision-making processes. In contrast, cabinets with min-
isters enjoying strong individual autonomy are very likely to become less centralised
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during such extraordinary events. These cabinet members may not only be reluctant to
centralise decision-making procedures, they may also apply successful means to resist
such attempts. Our claim is that the more centripetal cabinets decide under ordinary cir-
cumstances, the more likely is a centralisation of institutional arrangements for executive
decision-making during crises.
On the other hand, the executive-legislative nexus is likely to affect executive deci-
sion-making during crisis, as crises may call for emergency legislation and bylaws and
may affect the extent of parliamentary scrutiny (’t Hart et al. 1993). Whereas single-party
governments in parliamentary systems are supported by a parliamentary majority which is
strongly intertwined with executive offices, coalition governments need to accommodate
– maybe also conflicting – interests between coalition parties also within the central gov-
ernment organisation. During crises, it is reasonable to assume that single-party govern-
ments are thus able to affect pre-existing decision-making arrangements within the ex-
ecutive more radically than coalition governments that are more likely to be less capable
of making radical adjustments. In sum, this article argues that the institutionalisation of
executive decision-making mechanisms during crises, i.e. the creation, maintenance and
change of distinct mechanisms of decision-making, can be accounted with two explana-
tory dimensions, i.e. the principles structuring cabinet as well as the nexus between the
legislative and the executive. We expect that differences in these institutional features af-
fect the institutionalisation of executive decision-making arrangements during the global
financial and economoic crisis.
3. The executive decision-making process in Germany and Spain
3.1 The configuration of the cabinet under pressure
The German cabinet is structured by three constitutional principles entrenched into a sin-
gle article of the Basic Law that stresses a principle of leadership by the Chancellor (Kan-
zlerprinzip), by cabinet (Kabinettsprinzip), and by departmental ministers (Ressortprin-
zip) (Art. 65 GG; Mayntz 1980: 142). The first principle is expressed in various preroga-
tives of the Chancellor, e.g. to appoint and dismiss ministers2, to organise ministries by
‘organisational decrees’ (Organisationserlass des Bundeskanzlers) (Lehnguth/Vogelge-
sang 1988), and to issue general policy guidelines (Pfister 1974; von Beyme 1979; König
1991: 209, 216). These responsibilities, however, are strongly constrained by the depart-
mental principle and the autonomy of departmental ministers to organise their own de-
partments and formulate departmental policies. Nevertheless, German cabinets decide
collectively and thus the constitutional triangle of principles structuring cabinet decision-
making is assumed to be in permanent unbalance. In practice, the departmentall principle
is the most recognised and protected (Johnson 1983: 110; Mayntz 1987: 4).
With the advent of the financial and economic crisis, executive decision-making pro-
cesses were adjusted towards a ‘dual centre’ (Fleischer 2010). At the political level, the
first major government reaction to the crisis in public was a press conference by the
Chancellor and the Finance Minister – to announce federal government guarantees for all
private savings in German banks. Likewise, the various government declarations before
Parliament to announce and explain government responses to the crisis were issued by the
Chancellor, but also by the Minister of Finance. This strong relationship between the
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Chancellor and the Minister of Finance was also expressed when the Chancellor dele-
gated the lead for the second economic stimulus package to the Minister of Finance and
not to the Minister for Economic Affairs. When the latter complained in public about his
exclusion from the process, the Chancellor responded quite clearly that ‘[d]uring the
acute financial crisis, (…) the Minister of Finance is the responsible minister’ (Merkel,
quoted by FAS 30.11.2008: 4). The Chancellor’s statement was not supported by the
Chancellor principle, but legitimised through extraordinary circumstances – and enabled
by a comparatively weak Minister for Economic Affairs who did not succeed in insisting
on his right to lead government policies in his portfolio (expert interviews).
At operational level, a key network emerged between officials from the Chancellery,
the Ministry of Finance, and the German Central Bank (FAS 15.02.2009: 2). These net-
works were partly formalised by the creation of two inter-ministerial committees respon-
sible for managing the two newly introduced funds for stabilising the financial market
and stimulating the economy. Both committees comprised one administrative state secre-
tary from the Ministries of Finance, for Economic Affairs, and of Justice, a division head
from the Chancellery, as well as representatives from the Länder, and one representative
from the Central Bank on an advisory basis.3 Although the formal exclusion of other
ministries from these decisions may partly be explained with the responsibilities of those
actors involved in stabilising German banks or deciding on credits for German compa-
nies, the apparent spill-over effects of the financial and economic crisis on other policy
sectors caused some tensions between the new ‘peripheral’ ministries and the ‘crisis core
executive’ (expert interviews).
In addition, the responsible executive actors required policy advice in two new forms.
On the one hand, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), responsible for the
supervision of the financial sector in Germany, did not gain an influential role in the co-
ordination of measures against the crisis – partly because of a difficult relationship be-
tween the Minister of Finance and the agency head (SZ 17./18.01.2009: 3). Instead, the
Minister of Finance relied heavily on the German Central Bank and its chairman who was
also involved in laying down the general terms of the law issued to stabilise the German
financial sector (FMStG 2008; FAZ 13.10.2008: 26; FTD 21.04.2009). This advisory role
of the Central Bank was initially planned to be expanded towards administering the spe-
cial fund to stabilise the financial market, but the chairman strongly rejected this as a
threat of the bank’s independence (FAZ 17.10.2008: 12). As a compromise, a new ‘Fi-
nancial Market Stabilisation Agency’ was established as public law agency under legal
and functional supervision of the Ministry of Finance to administer the fund, staffed with
secondees from the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance in exceptional cases (expert
interviews). On the other hand, the Ministry of Finance commissioned external advise
from several law firms to formulate the bill to stabilise the German financial sector (BT-
Drs. 16/12547 [2009]). For the political actors within the ministry, an involvement of pri-
vate law firms provided valuable expert knowledge which was argued to be unavailable
in the civil service (SZ 07.03.2006: 19; expert interviews). In addition, these law firms
provided ‘coordinated knowledge’ by sending teams with members of different legal spe-
cialities – which is more difficult to receive from a ministerial bureaucracy, particularly if
defferent fields of law are addressed that are handled by different sections (if expertise on
these issues is available at all) (FAZ 06.01.2009: 15). For departmental officials, though,
the contracting of private law firms appeared as a threat for their monopoly of policy ad-
vice and resulted in some conflicts between the operational and the departmental leader-
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ship level about basic assumptions and policy goals incorporated in the law as one of the
major governmental responses to the crisis at the financial market in Germany. Later, also
the Ministry for Economic Affairs contracted a private law firm to formulate an alterna-
tive draft to the second major law on government take-overs of private banks – also to
strengthen its argumentative position within central government (FMStErgG [2009]; FAZ
12.03.2009: 13; expert interviews). Thus, private law firms provided expertise to cope
with the extraordinary complexity for these bills, but delivered also (legal) arguments in
favour or against distinct paragraphs reflecting apparent policy objectives (expert inter-
views).
In sum, the traditional imbalance of the three constitutional principles in Germany re-
stricted a strong shift towards the Chancellery in executive decision-making because the
other two principles maintained their relevance, i.e. departmental autonomy and collec-
tive decision-making. Instead, major policy decisions to cope with the crisis were mainly
pre-formulated by a dual centre, comprising the Chancellery and the Ministry of Finance.
At operational level, a small number of key actors managed the two funds established as
key measures to cope with the financial and economic crisis. Following pre-existing deci-
sion-making arrangements, these were established as inter-ministerial committees, com-
prising the same executive actors and resulting in an ‘executive concentration’ of deci-
sion-making processes. Besides, the dual centre coopled other actors, particularly the
Central Bank and private law firms, to formulate and draft the necessary legislation under
the tight timeframe. However, both were commissioned in compliance with the depart-
mental principle, i.e. the Ministry of Finance included the Central Bank and different pri-
vate law firms were assigned by different ministries.
Like Germany, Spain is characterised by a similar configuration of authority in cabi-
net, although the balance rather favours the Prime Minister and grants less autonomy to
individual ministers. The Prime Minister has similar prerogatives than the German Chan-
cellor of appointing and dismissing ministers and issuing general policy guidelines. How-
ever, the PM enjoys more powers in organising ministries by royal decrees and although
Spanish ministers manage their departments on their own, this autonomy is not practiced
like in Germany due to the features of the electoral and party system that have not fa-
voured coalition governments (Bar 2004). Under ordinary circumstances, economic deci-
sions are taken collegially in weekly sessions through different collective bodies, includ-
ing inter-ministerial commissions, the commission of state secretaries and undersecretar-
ies, and the cabinet. Firstly, the inter-departmental commission for economic affairs is
chaired by the Finance Minister and composed of the Ministers for Infrastructure, for La-
bour, of Industry, for Environment, as well as two state secretaries from the Ministry of
Finance and Economics. Its main function is to prepare economic decisions between
these ministries which can be later presented to the cabinet (López Calvo 1996). Second-
ly, the commission of state secretaries and undersecretaries is chaired by the Deputy
Prime Minister and meets weekly to prepare the cabinet meetings. Finally, the cabinet –
or council of ministers – sits at the top of the decision-making process to solve political
issues which have not been compromised at the two lower level collegial bodies (Bar
1988; López Calvo 1996). Moreover, less collegial informal arrangements are shaped by
the policy advisory machinery and bend the balance in cabinet towards the PM. Above all
policy advisors, the personal cabinet of the Prime Minister has an outstanding position.
This personal cabinet has grown in size and functions since the early 1980s by tightening
the control on public policy making (Bar 1997, Heywood/Molina 2000). These dynamics
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have been referred by some authors as a growing institutionalisation of executive deci-
sion-making (Heywood/Molina 2000) or the ‘presidentialisation’ of the executive (Guer-
rero 2009).
During the financial and economic crisis, a further concentration of power occurred
in the PM’s entourage. The crisis has increased the influence of the head of the Prime
Minister’s cabinet in economic affairs. Firstly, he became a formal participant of the gov-
ernmental commission for economic affairs before the crisis (expert interviews). Thus,
the ‘eyes and ears’ of the Prime Minister became present when the preliminary economic
measures were discussed and prepared for cabinet. Furthermore, the head of the cabinet
participates in the commission of state secretaries and undersecretaries because of his
formal rank as state secretary. However, as he is not in charge of any particular portfolio,
like other commission members, he acts as the PM’s main policy enforcer. Moreover,
whenever the political Deputy Prime Minister does not chair the commission, the head of
the cabinet replaces her in this role. The head of the cabinet rarely expresses his opinion
in public. However, he will convene ministers for solving their dispute, and this happened
more frequently during the crisis (expert interviews). Secondly, the so-called ‘Prime
Minister’s Economic Office’ (Oficina Económica del Presidente), which is subordinated to
the head of the PM’s cabinet, took the lead in launching the so-called ‘Plan E’ – instead
of the Ministry of Finance and Economics. The Plan E was used as a brand name by the
Zapatero government to present the different stimulus packages since January 2009. Fi-
nally, the participation of Spain in the G-20 has also been coordinated from the PM’s
Economic Office with participation of the Ministry of Finance and Economics and the
Bank of Spain (expert interviews).
In Spain, the key advisory sources for fiscal and economic policies – next to the re-
sponsible ministry – are the Central Bank and the the PM’s Economic Office, whose
predecessors date back to 1996 when the Aznar government created a Budget Office (Ofi-
cina Presupuestaria), subordinated to the PM, in order to monitor the compliance with
Maastricht criteria (Molina/Heywood 2000). In 2004, PM Zapatero replaced the Budget Of-
fice with the Prime Minister’s Economic Office and staffed it with prominent economists
from the Central Bank and other private financial institutions. This independence of eco-
nomic opinion allows the Prime Minister to formulate own fiscal and economic policy
ideas which are not necessarily approved by the Minister of Finance and Economics. Be-
fore the crisis, the autonomy of the Minister of Finance and Economics has been consid-
erably preserved, also resulting in a soft opposition to the Prime Minister. Besides, the
Ministry of Finance and Economics has enjoyed an indisputable stability in terms of post
inholders (four persons acted as Minister of Finance and Economics since 1982) and in
terms of policy ideas (Molina/Rhodes 2007; Chari/Heywood: 2009; Royo 2009a; Field
2009a).
During the crisis, the policy ideas to overcome the economic and financial crisis dif-
fered between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance and Economics – or rather
the PM’s Economic Office and the Ministry of Economics (expert interviews). Whereas
the Prime Minister favoured a strong expansive fiscal response and hands-on public-
sector engagement, supported also by the Minister of Industry, a former head of the PM’s
Economic Office, the Minister of Finance and Economics together with the governor of
the Central Bank were more concerned with the fiscal debt and the intervention of the
public sector in the economy. These tensions between the Prime Minister and the Minis-
ter of Finance and Economics could partially explain his replacement in the government
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reshuffle in April 2009 by a seasoned (former minister of health and later of public ad-
ministration) low-profile technocrat, Mrs Salgado. Moreorver, Salgado is assumed to dis-
cuss her economic policy with the PM’s Economic Office – strengthening the latter’s po-
sition where the ‘yes sayers’ overcome the opposition of the ‘naysayers’ in the ministry
of economics (expert interviews). For instance, the state secretary for finances was recti-
fied by Salgado when he announced the need to freeze the salary of public sector em-
ployees to overcome the crisis. After a reaction from the Prime Minister’s Office and the
political Deputy Prime Ministers, the new Minister of Finance and Economics rectified
her state secretary in a ‘yes sayer’ manner (El País 25.02.2010).
In sum, the head of the PM’s cabinet and the PM’s Economic Office have considera-
bly influenced the governmental responses to the crisis. The traditional key role of the
Ministry of Economics was significantly weakened. During the crisis, executive actors
recognised the need to firstly ask the PM’s Economic Office to pursue anti-crisis meas-
ures, instead of asking the Ministry of Economics (expert interviews), reducing thus the
ambiguous paths of the system: formal channels through the delegated governmental
commission chaired by the Minister of the Economic and informal channels filtered by
the chief of the PM’s cabinet and Economic Office.
3.2 The executive-legislative nexus during the crisis
Traditionally, German general elections result in coalition governments of two parties,
most often a larger and a smaller coalition party. The two catch-all parties governed in a
Grand Coalition only twice. The German parliamentary system is characterised by a
strong fusion between the executive and the legislative, resulting in a central government
organisation interlocked with party competition (Lehmbruch 1976). Several formal and
informal means emerged to manage the relationships between the executive and the leg-
islative arena. On the one hand, German governments issue since the 1980s a ‘Coalition
agreement’ (Koalitionsvertrag) laying down the legislative programme for the upcoming
legislative period which is generally perceived as a crucial document with binding and
disciplining character on the executive (Saalfeld 1997: 77; Müller 2005). On the other
hand, German governments establish traditionally a ‘coalition committee’ (Koalition-
sausschuss) comprising the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor (a cabinet minister from the
coalition party), the chairmen of the parliamentary parties, and, if they are not among the
aforementioned, the party chairmen (Manow/Ganghof 2005: 23; Miller 2008). This body
plays a crucial role in smoothing the policy process between the executive and the legis-
lative (Rudzio 2006: 255-9).
When it became apparent that the German financial sector was rather heavily affected
by the financial crisis, the coalition committee met in October 2008 to coordinate gov-
ernment responses. However, during the following months, it met less frequently than
during the months before the crisis. Its following meeting in early January 2009 was used
by its participants to limit the time frame for issuing a second economic stimulus package
and commit them to a rather tight time schedule for decision-making. Thus, extra meet-
ings of the parliamentary parties were scheduled for the following day to decide upon the
package, and a government declaration by the Chancellor was announced for the day after
(SZ 07.01.2009: 6; FAZ 17.01.2009: 5). Although the legislative actors were informed
about the content of the government proposals rather late, they agreed to comply with the
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government’s tight deadlines, also because they were convinced that the executive pos-
sesses more knowledge about the severe nature of the crisis and the measures to cope
with it – also in accordance with decisions taken by other governments in the European
Union and the US (expert interviews).
Nevertheless, the crisis was also characterised by party competition visible in execu-
tive decision-making, although these dynamics were partly caused by the upcoming gen-
eral election in autumn 2009. Hence, the Foreign Minister and front-runner for the SPD
issued a ‘European Future Pact for Employment’ to outline possible measures for coping
with the crisis at EU level and signalling own expertise in the field to the electorate (SZ
14.11.2008: 7; Steinmeier 2008). Also for the second economic stimulus package issued
in spring 2009, particularly SPD cabinet ministers, i.e. the Finance Minister and the For-
eign Minister, dominated the policy agenda and proposed the so-called ‘environment in-
centive’, commonly known as ‘car scrappage scheme’ (Abwrackprämie) which became
very popular and has been adopted by other governments afterwards (expert interviews;
FAZ 14.04.2009: 12).4 The cabinet members from the Conservative party did propose less
policy measures and thus the Chancellor adopted the proposals from her SPD colleagues
almost without any amendments and declared them as the government’s policy responses
(expert interviews). Likewise, the Foreign Minister invited trade unions to discuss meas-
ures against the economic crisis – and to show his party’s eligibility to trade union mem-
bers (FTD 28.05.2009: 23). The Chancellor reacted to these increasing party-political ac-
tivities by publicly rejecting a ‘race to the top with proposals one after another’ (Merkel,
01.12.2008). However, the Chancellor adjusted her cautious strategy by hosting an
‘economy summit’ with representatives from the executive, science, industry, trade un-
ions, and interest groups to discuss possible options for coping with the economic crisis
(FAZ 13.12.2008: 12).
In sum, during the crisis the German government relied less on its traditional deci-
sion-making bodies comprising executive and legislative actors such as the coalition
committee. Instead, decision-making was mainly processed within the executive, incorpo-
rating legislative actors at a rather late stage. Partly, the time pressure and the high level
of uncertainty about the effects of the crisis as well as its solutions facilitated this execu-
tive dominance whereby legislative actors somewhat abandoned their privileges to amend
government proposals. Partly, though, these processes were facilitated by the Grand Coa-
lition in power which had established new means for executive decision-making, incorpo-
rating legislative objectives even more early and intensively than previous governments
(cf. Fleischer 2010). Nevertheless the fusion between the executive and the legislative led
to a spill-over of political competition and electoral campaigning into the executive area.
Thus, ministers who are traditionally not responsible for financial or economic issues be-
came highly engaged in proposing anti-crisis measures (most notably the Foreign Minis-
ter).
Spain has transited towards a majoritarian democracy on the dimension executive-
parties. Firstly, in recent times most governments have enjoyed a concentration of the ex-
ecutive power in single-party majority cabinets, although at times the government party
has had a parliamentary minority as with the two Zapatero governments (2004-2012), the
first Aznar government (1996-2000), and the last Gonzalez government (1993-1996). In
those cases, the government was forced to rely on pacts with nationalists parties (Gunther
et al. 2004; Field 2009a, 2009b), basically from Basque Country and Catalonia but also
from Galicia and Canary Islands. Those pacts have been preferred to coalition govern-
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ments according to Guerrero (2003), because nationalist parties gain transfer of powers
or investments in their territory (benefits are concentrated) and do not need to participate
in a government that may need to take unpopular measures. The performance of minority
governments in Spain is very similar to majority governments measured by the percent-
age of government bills that are passed by the legislative. Between 1982 and 2008, both
types of government passed approximately 89 percent of their legislation, outperforming
comparatively minority governments in other countries (Field 2009b: 421). This implies that
minority governments have empirically behaved like single-party majority governments.
Secondly, Spain is characterised by a dominant executive in its relations with the
legislature, which has allowed implementing several partisan and divisive measures (edu-
cational reforms of the left and the right, legislation on abortion (twice), or the legalisa-
tion of same-sex marriage). In this regard, Van Biezen and Hopkin (2005: 124) consider
that the Spanish parliamentary system is subject to ‘presidential’ tendencies, while other
Spanish scholars use a stronger concept of presidential parliamentarism (Aragón 2002).
Under normal circumstances, the legislative process must follow the normal parliamen-
tary procedure of amendments and voting on the draft by the different parties represented
in the chamber. In recent times there has been an increasing involvement of the PM’s of-
fice in the draft of legislation that will go later on through the normal parliamentary
channels (expert interviews).
For extraordinary times of crisis, the Prime Minister may use the ‘royal decree law’
(Real Decreto Ley) to speed up decisions through the chamber. They are executive orders
that go to Parliament for approval or refusal, without allowing any decision-making role
to parliamentarians or any room for partial amendments. Many anti-crisis initiatives have
been issued as royal decree laws, without any intervention of the parliamentary groups or
the parliamentary coalitions. According to the constitutional law, this measure should be
taken in extraordinary situations and thus they were traditionally used for getting the ap-
proval of special aid financial packages to be given to flood, draught victims or similar
cases, but also to modify existing legislation on fiscal matters, for instance. During the
global financial and economic crisis, executive orders have been passed six times be-
tween February 2009 and April 2009 (totalling 14 in 2009) and ten times in 2008. In
comparative terms, the number of royal decree laws is not unusually high as the number
of these laws has averaged around 12 in the 2000s. However, the number is considerably
high for a government in minority in Parliament during the crisis and the concentration of
these executive orders around economic policies has been unusual.
In all these cases, the urgency was argued as a consequence of the financial and eco-
nomic crisis. Critics from the opposition parties voiced continuously their concern about
the extensive (ab)use of executive orders to alter the current legal system and the low
prediction capacity of the government, that proposed, for instance, to amend the budget-
ary law within only several months after its approval. Since executive orders have been
used also in the past, this concentration of power to launch legislation in crisis follows a
previous pattern, albeit with an increasing intensity. The packaging of anti-crisis meas-
ures in royal decree laws was also a concern for officials of the Ministry of Finance and
Economics, who tried to block the executive order process in the delegated commission
for economic affairs (expert interview). The blocking strategy might have come from a
different view on the responses to the crisis, as discussed above.
Recently, the Prime Minister appointed an interparty commission to regain the trust
of the financial markets and the European Union against the risk of default the Spanish
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duties. According to Royo (2009b), the measures already taken by government have fo-
cused on short-term problems and they have not addressed the fundamental imbalances of
the Spanish economy. Officially, the commission is asked to formulate measures to over-
come the severe effects, particularly on the Spanish economy, but it is also a mechanism
to incorporate legislative actors earlier in the policy process and broaden the political
support for upcoming government policies of more durable nature. Moreover, this expert
commission may also have been created in order to regain the electorate’s recently de-
creasing trust in government and legitimise future governmental action. As such, the ex-
pert commission is chaired by the Ministers of Finance and Economics, of Public Works,
and of Industry – all three close allies of the PM and key figures in his party. This inter-
party commission has predecessors, particularly during the transition from dictatorship to
democracy. As such, the commission follows a well-known pattern of coordination in the
executive, although hardly practiced in recent times. Although the government could still
push forward some legislative measures, always negotiating specific votes, as the social-
ist party is in minority in Parliament, the creation of the interparty commission would
help the government to adopt contested decisions related to the liberalisation of the la-
bour market and the reform of the pension system by seeking legitimacy through the sup-
port of other parties.
4. Conclusion
This article examines the change and inertia of institutional arrangements for executive
decision-making during the global financial and economic crisis from a comparative per-
spective. Although the time frame of this particular crisis limits an assessment of the du-
rability of observed changes, it offers explanatory perspectives to understand institution-
alisation within central government organisations during extraordinary circumstances. In
comparison, the institutional arrangements for decision-making in the Spanish executive
are mainly characterised by strengthening the pre-existing centralised decision-making
mechanisms and prioritising the role of the head of PM’s cabinet in various procedures in
which the Ministry of Finance and Economics would have traditionally dominated. In
contrast, the changes of the institutional arrangements for government decision-making in
Germany can be characterised as ‘executive concentration’. The pre-existing decision-
making means were applied also during the crisis, albeit key decisions were coordinated
in a smaller crisis core executive, also ignoring some formal requirements on lead and
participation.
The comparative case studies confirm the explanatory relevance of the two selected
contextual features. On the one hand, the dominant departmental principle in Germany
mainly prevailed for executive decision-making – except the changing lead for the second
economic stimulus package which can be interpreted as a deviant action by the Chancel-
lor who, in turn, relied upon a dual centre with the Minister of Finance for preparing col-
lective cabinet decisions. Similarly, the centripetal Spanish cabinet with the PM as most
powerful actor facilitated a further centralisation of institutional arrangements for execu-
tive decision-making during the crisis, e.g. the strengthening of PM’s involvement and
the engagement of his personal cabinet, while the role of the Minister of Finance and
Economics has been weakened. On the other hand, the strong nexus between the execu-
tive and the legislative in the German Grand Coalition enabled a dominance of the ex-
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ecutive under the severe pressures of the crisis. In contrast, the Spanish single-party gov-
ernment could not rely upon a functional equivalent supporting the relationship between
the executive and the legislative until very late in the crisis. Instead, the Spanish PM af-
fected legislative decision-making directly by issuing many crisis measures as executive
orders which block any amendments by parliamentarians. Hence, the comparatively
stronger institutional requirements imposed on actors in the German politico-administra-
tive system obstructed any radical changes of decision-making measures or, in theoretical
terms, any institutionalisation processes resulting in strong centralisation dynamics. In
contrast, the comparatively weaker institutional constraints of the Spanish politico-
administrative system enabled the PM to apply a more centripetal pattern of executive
decision-making and institutionalise further centralisation.
Furthermore, the comparative analysis reveals that in both countries the apparent
policy ambiguity during the crisis resulted in dynamic applications and adjustments of
pre-existing institutional arrangements for executive decision-making. In Germany, the
high level of policy ambiguity resulted in a stronger reliance upon external advice which
was incorporated into executive decision-making processes, partly initiating new deci-
sion-making means. In contrast, the conflicts between the Spanish PM’s Economic Office
and the Ministry for Economics regarding the policy measures to cope with the crisis
have shifted executive decision-making towards the PM. As the policy measures did not
work as intended, an inter-party commission was created to achieve a consensus within
this ambiguous environment.
The different patterns of executive decision-making did not unfold in dynamics asso-
ciated with critical junctures as the external challenges of the global financial and eco-
nomic crisis may have suggested in the first place. Instead, even these extraordinary
events result in incremental adaptations or gradual institutionalisation of executive deci-
sion-making processes. The different Spanish and German experiences can be seen as dif-
ferent distributions of power among executive actors by rather similar institutional con-
texts – which would lead to the conclusion that either these pre-existing features filter
external challenges differently and more research is needed on the mechanisms of gradual
institutionalisation processes accompanying extraordinary events or other rather dissimi-
lar institutional features may account for these differences such as administrative legacies
or the party composition of governments.
Anmerkungen
1 We are very grateful for comments to the manuscript by participants of a dms-workshop on this special is-
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‘Escaping the iron cage of bureaucratic control or bringing the bureaucracy back in’ as well as the 60th
PSA Conference, Panel 21 ‘Executive Politics and Reform’ for comments on an earlier version of the pa-
per.
2 Formally, the Federal President appoints and dismisses ministers according to the chancellor’s proposal.
3 The Länder representative and the adviser from the Central Bank were only involved in the inter-
ministerial committee for the fund stabilising the financial market.
4 Various inventors were discussed in the press, particularly the head of the German Association of the
Automotive Industry proliferated this measure (Der Spiegel 2009: 49).
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